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TIME TO BAIL OUT:ALTERNATIVES TO
THE BUSH-PAULSON PLAN
         .               and  .             
It’s official—the Maestro (former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan) has spoken:
the wizards of Wall Street messed up. Big-time.After a career that spanned a half century, during
which he had continuously claimed,“We don’t need regulation,” Greenspan admitted before the
House of Representatives that he was “in a state of disbelief” since the ongoing financial turmoil
has shown that private market regulation and counterparty monitoring didn’t work
1 (Greenspan
2008). Nay, market self-discipline failed catastrophically. While serving as Fed chairman, he had
advocated unsupervised securitization, subprime lending, option ARMs, credit-default swaps,
and all manner of financial alchemy in the belief that markets “work” to reduce and spread risk,
and to allocate it to those best able to assess and bear it. Free of nasty government intervention,
markets would stabilize. His successor, Ben Bernanke, drank at least some of that Kool-Aid, opin-
ing that the era of the Great Moderation had arrived,guided by the gentle hand of the benevolent
Fed.
2 So long as the Fed kept inflation expectations in check through well-telegraphed interest
rate fine-tuning,all would be hunky-dory.As Greenspan now admits,he could never have imagined
the outcome: a financial and economic crisis of biblical proportions.
Here’s the problem. Market forces are not stabilizing. Left to their own devices, Wall Street
wizards gleefully ran right off the cliff, and took the rest of us with them for good measure. The
natural instability of market processes was recognized long ago by John Maynard Keynes, and
convincingly updated by our late colleague Hyman P. Minsky throughout his career. Indeed, the
current crisis has been called a “Minsky moment”—and Minsky deserves credit, as the crisis has2 Policy Note, 2008 / 6
been a long time coming, and the fallout will affect us for years
(Wray 2008a,2008b; Kregel 2008).It is more fitting to call it the
“Minsky half century,”for Minsky’s theory explained the trans-
formation of the economy over the whole postwar period from
robust to fragile, and warned that increasingly severe financial
criseswouldresult.Towit,inthepastthreedecadeswehaveexpe-
rienced the savings-and-loan crisis, the leveraged buyout–junk
bond fiasco, three stock market crashes (1987, 2000, 2008), the
Long-Term Capital Management failure, today’s global finan-
cial crisis that began with America’s subprime mortgages, and
the commodities market crash that is unfolding. Minsky
pointed his finger at managed money—huge pools of pension
funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endow-
ments, money market funds—that are outside traditional bank-
ing and therefore largely underregulated and undersupervised.
With a large appetite for risk, managed money sought high
returnspromised byWall Street’sfinancialengineers,whoinno-
vated highly complex instruments that few people understood.
That actually made them more desirable because their values
would be anything Wall Street wanted them to be. High prices
could be assigned to toxic waste (that is, literally, the technical
term used by insiders and regulators to describe the new finan-
cial instruments) and large fees booked. Because the rewards
were stupendous, the financial engineers did not mind that
their job tenure was expected to be measured in months. They
wouldcollecteight-figurebonusesandjumpshipwhenthewhole
Ponzi pyramid scheme suffered the inevitable collapse. Only the
free-market true believers, like former Fed Chairman Greenspan,
are surprised by the outcome.Everyone else saw it coming.
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ButafunnythinghappenedonthewaytoArmageddon.Wall
Street’s movers and shakers bailed while the bailing was good,but
they moved on to Washington just in time for the chickens to
come home to roost.Their (Bush) administration has had to deal
with the crisis—a task for which it has been ill prepared. Wall
Street creates crises,but it is“Clueless in Seattle”when it comes to
bailing them out. Hence, we’ve had more Paulson Plans than
Heinz has pickles—as Minsky might have put it—with one after
anotherresoundinglyrejectedbymarkets,Congress,andthepub-
lic. After presenting Congress with a three-page ultimatum to
authorize him to spend $700 billion with impunity, Treasury
SecretaryHenryM.Paulsonwasforcedtoreturnwithhatinhand
for a good thrashing and an 800-odd-page law to constrain him.
While he still wanted to spend most of the money buying toxic
waste,markets rejected even that plan on the recognition that the
volume of bad assets on the books of financial institutions is
in the trillions of dollars. They preferred the strategy adopted
abroad:injectcapital.Paulsoncavedin,butheaddedanAmerican
twist: Treasury would become an owner in exchange for a capital
injection but would not exercise any ownership rights, such as
replacing the management that created the mess. We wouldn’t
want the visible hand of government to interfere with precious
market forces, after all.
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Perhaps more importantly, Secretary Paulson has recently
confirmed the worst fears of conspiracy theorists: the bailout
would be usedas anopportunityto consolidatecontroloverthe
nation’s financial system in the hands of a few large (Wall Street)
banks.
5 His team will use the bailout funds to subsidize pur-
chases of troubled banks by“healthy”banks.What are the odds
that the list of the names of healthy banks might include a
Goldman Sachs,or a Morgan (or two)? Crises inevitably lead to
some consolidation, so the rescue package will be used to help
the process along. Incredibly, Wall Street banks can pick the
takeover targets by downgrading the outlook of the financial
institutions they would like to own (raising the price of credit-
default swap “insurance” and lowering stock values), triggering
Treasury, FDIC, and Fed intervention to subsidize the merger.
Markets do work in mysterious ways.Who needs socialism?
Alternatives to the Bush-Paulson Plan
Policymakers and commentators have tended to confuse liquidity
andsolvencyissues,andsimilarly,lendingwithspending.Asthe
crisisunfolded,manyfinancialinstitutionswerehitwithliquid-
ity problems: they could not cover required payments or with-
drawals because they could not obtain“cash.”For the most part,
this resulted because they could not borrow, either from the Fed
or from financial markets.The Fed initially limited its lending to
only those institutions for which it was directly responsible, and
only lent against qualifying assets. Institutions needing funds
but unable to meet the Fed’s requirements could not borrow in
the market because potential lenders feared they could be
caught short of “cash” themselves, or that the borrowers would
not be able to repay the loans in a timely manner. Thus, Bear
Stearns fell quickly for liquidity reasons; after its demise, the
Fed expanded its lending to types of institutions formerly
excluded—an action that might have prevented the fire sale of
Bear if the Fed had acted only a few hours earlier.More recently,
the Fed expanded the range of assets it accepts as collateral,andThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
even decided to buy commercial paper. In addition, FDIC
insurance was extended to cover deposits up to $250,000, and
guarantees were extended to previously uninsured deposits at
money market funds (to avoid a run after the Reserve Fund
“broke the buck”).All of this helps to reduce liquidity pressures
because the government guarantees reduce the incentive for
depositors to demand cash—thereby lessening financial institu-
tions’ need for cash. While it took far too long for the Fed (and
the FDIC) to recognize the proper policy response to a liquidity
crisis, we have finally come close to a resolution.
To complete this “lender-of-last-resort” intervention, the
Fed should remove all collateral requirements.A crisis is not the
right time to try to teach financial institutions about the wis-
dom of holding “secondary reserves” of safe assets eligible for
discounting. Since regulators and supervisors sat by idly while
financial institutions accumulated tons of toxic waste on their
balance sheets, they were implicitly (and in Greenspan’s case,
explicitly) approving these purchases as acceptable assets. To
quell the run to liquidity, the Fed must now lend without limit
no matter what assets reside in bank portfolios. The Fed has
moved to pay interest on reserves—which will allow it to hit its
overnight interest rate target with much greater precision—
anothergooddecisionasitletsbanksearninterestonthereserves
they must hold for protection against withdrawals.It needs to go
a step further: it should provide loans farther out the maturity
structure at targeted rates. For example, it should offer one-
month, two-month, and three-month lending at interest rates it
chooses. This will allow the Fed to stabilize interest rates of
longer maturity, while providing loan terms to suit the bor-
rower’sneeds.Finally,theFDICshouldeliminateanycapsonits
insurance to include all demand and time deposits in member
institutions. This would protect the larger deposits held by busi-
nesstocoverpayrollsandotherexpenses.Theideathatdepositor
surveillance helps to discipline bank lending has been exposed as
purefolly.Eventhewealthiestandmostsophisticateddepositors
never voiced concern that their financial institutions were taking
excessiverisk.Intruth,depositorscannotlegallyobtaintheinfor-
mation they would need to determine what risks the institutions
were exposed to—even if they were capable of understanding the
data and models used—because borrower confidentiality is pro-
tected. What really matters is regulation and oversight by the
supervisory agencies.Once institutions are allowed to buy some
asset class, the Fed must be willing to lend against it, and the
Treasury is on the hook to protect the depositors.
We now turn to the more vexing issue: insolvency. This is
one of Donald Rumsfeld’s“unknown unknowns,”although it is
probable that many and perhaps most financial institutions are
insolvent today—with a black hole of negative net worth that
wouldswallowPaulson’sentire$700billioninonegulp.Forthis
reason,markets immediately rejected the plan to buy bad assets:
it is far too small to make a dent, so banks will be left with
plenty of capital-draining toxic waste. Indeed, if the U.S.
Treasury pays anything near to “true” value for the bad assets,
banks are actually worse off. Those left holding them will need
to recognize the losses and announce to the world that they are
insolvent, along with all those that do sell assets to the Treasury
at equity-destroying prices. On the other hand, if the Treasury
pays prices high enough so that banks don’t have to recognize
large losses, the $700 billion (now much less because $250 bil-
lion of that is being diverted to capital injections) will buy only
a tiny fraction of the“troubled”assets. This would work only if
we let financial institutions pretend that the Treasury’s overpay-
ment represents market value. But we could accomplish this
result with no purchases at all: Treasury can just declare that all
assets are good and business can go on as usual.
That is not a half-bad idea.Unlike a liquidity problem,insol-
vency problems do not have to be resolved in haste.Indeed,there
are very good reasons to postpone action. First, the Paulson team
will be gone soon, with matters left to President-elect Obama’s
newadministration.Second,asmentionedabove,theplanneduse
of bailout funds for industry consolidation is troubling. Perhaps
the next administration would not look so favorably on that;
and it is possible—one can at least have the audacity of hope—
that the next Treasury team will not be so heavily drawn from
one particular Wall Street bank. To keep the banks open, there
are any number of accounting sleights of hand that can be used.
For example: let them value assets at the original price paid; let
themwrite“networthcertificates”tocountascapital(essentially
lending capital to themselves); let them temporarily lower capi-
tal requirements; or, simply ignore the problem and hope it will
goaway.Surprisingly,thatcanwork—wediditintheearly1990s,
when all large banks were plausibly said to be insolvent. As the
economy recovers, some assets will recover values and banks
willbuynew,goodassetsandtherebyearntheirwaybacktosol-
vency. As Jessie Jones, who headed the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation’s (RFC) successful attempt to rescue the financial
system during the Great Depression,said:“Things nearly always
get better if you give them time. That is particularly true with4 Policy Note, 2008 / 6
collateral and properties and people”(Jones 1951,p.vi; see also,
Wray 1994).
This doesn’t always work, however.We left insolvent thrifts
open in the mid-1980s and they managed to transform a pretty
big problem into a monumental crisis that required a major
bailout.Here is the reason: we let them pursue business as usual
even though many of these were run by crooks engaged in con-
trol fraud (Black 2005). We left the crooks in charge, and they
grew their frauds as fast as they could (in his previous incarna-
tion as a character witness, Greenspan certified that high-flying
thrifts run by crooks like Charles Keating were providing the
model of good behavior to be emulated by all thrifts) (Wray
1994).Jones,on the other hand,replaced the management of all
the banks the RFC took over with—get this—honest and pru-
dent managers. This is something the current plan refuses to
consider—even though the government purchases ownership
shares, it would exercise no control over the financial institu-
tions it owns. If we are going to leave insolvent institutions
open, it is critically important to replace or at least control
management. Business as usual would be a disaster. The safest
course of action is to limit growth, as growth is the lifeblood
that makes control fraud profitable.
WeshouldfollowtheJessieJonesexampleandplacefinancial
institutions into three categories:healthy,troubled,and doomed.
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If there are any healthy banks, they will need only supervision.
Troubled banks should be placed in a form of conservatorship,
closelymanagedandconstrained—essentiallyheldinabeyanceto
see if their assets recover. Doomed banks need to be “resolved”;
that is,liquidated.Rather than adopting the Treasury’s consolida-
tion plan,it is probably better to sell the assets,pay off the depos-
itors, and let the owners and holders of subordinated debt lose.
There will be repercussions from that,but they can be dealt with.
For example, equity holders include pension funds, which are
alreadysufferinghugelosses.ThereislittledoubtthatthePension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is going to be severely
tested and may well become insolvent.And paying off the depos-
itors is going to bankrupt the FDIC, too. Hence, we are going to
need yet another bailout,of the PBGC and FDIC.Uncle Sam will
need to keep the checkbook handy.
Part of the justification for all of the bailout plans is the
argument that we need to open the flow of credit, on the view
that there is a huge unmet demand for loans by credit-rationed,
but safe,borrowers.Relieving banks of some of their bad assets,
orinjectingsomeequityintothem,issupposedtoincreasetheir
willingness to lend.That seems highly unlikely.There is now no
doubt that we are moving into a deep recession—not a good
time to lend even if we didn’t have the mother of all financial
crises. After a dozen years of virtually unrelenting deficit spend-
ing by the private sector, our households and firms are already
tooheavilyindebted.Theyshouldnot,andprobablydonotwant
to, borrow more. Government should not rely on, much less
encourage, more borrowing by the private sector to pull us out
of this recession. Resolving the liquidity crisis (mission almost
accomplished) plus an imposed purgatory to prevent financial
institutions from growing too fast by making unsound loans is
the best strategy. The Fed has already done what it can to
increase liquidity of commercial paper (an important source of
short term borrowing for firms and others). Keeping small-to-
medium-size banks open is the best way to ensure access to
credit once the economy recovers. Anecdotal evidence demon-
strates the wisdom of favoring“local community banks because
those are the bankers who understand their markets, and know
the businesses in their market. . . . Big banks don’t have a per-
sonal relationship with their small business customers”(Nocera
2008). This is yet another reason to reject the Treasury’s plan to
promote consolidation. Wall Street banks do not serve small,
local businesses. If policy strives to protect the supply of credit
tosmallfirms,itneedstopreservelocalbanks.Perhapsitistime
to reject “too big to fail” doctrine in favor of “too big to save,”
while saving the small banks.
Economic recovery is essential,but should not be sought at
the expense of burying households under another mountain of
debt. More jobs and rising incomes is the ticket for policy for-
mation by the new administration.
So far, the rescue plan has offered very little for homeown-
ers saddled with mortgage debt they cannot afford. Financial
institutions have been asked to voluntarily renegotiate mort-
gages, but that hasn’t worked for a variety of reasons. Many
banks holding mortgages don’t want to recognize losses,partic-
ularly if there is a possibility that the Treasury will use bailout
money to buy the bad assets. Since most mortgages were sliced
and diced,to be used as collateral against very complicated secu-
rities, renegotiating terms is extremely difficult.Government has
to take a more active role. Presidential candidate John McCain
proposed that the government provide low fixed-rate mortgages
at the current value of the homes, while paying off existing
mortgages. This means the Treasury would take the full loss
between the original mortgage amount and the value of theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
new mortgage, while the financial institutions would get off
scot-free. Any such plan also faces a difficult selection process,
since it must determine exactly who deserves mortgage relief.A
better alternative is to offer a 5 percent, 30-year mortgage pro-
vided directly by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to all comers. The
new mortgages would be made for 90 percent of the current
appraised value, with homeowners providing a down payment
of 10 percent. Many home purchasers over the past five years
were duped by shady mortgage brokers into assuming subprime
and other mortgages they could not afford; whatever down pay-
ment they made originally is now lost because their mortgages
areunderwater(greaterthanthecurrentvalueof thehouse).The
federal government should provide grants to them equal to their
original down payment plus any fees they have paid. They can
use these grants for new down payments; or they can “take the
money and run.”Some analysts,including Dean Baker,have pro-
posed“rent-to-own”schemes, whereby homeowners can remain
in their homes by paying fair market rent, with an option to buy
later.FDIC chief Sheila C.Bair has said that the goal should be to
reduce home payments to no more than one-third of household
income. That sets a reasonable standard for identifying those
needing help: if current mortgage payments exceed one-third of
income, the family would be eligible for the new Fannie- and
Freddie-supplied loans.
Through such programs, we can keep most people in their
homes if they want to remain there. When all is said and done,
there is going to be a cost of “bailing out”homeowners because
the original mortgages are greater than the new mortgages to be
made. This cost should be shared by the Treasury and institu-
tions holding the mortgages (mostly,the mortgages are the col-
lateral behind securities). Carrots and sticks can induce the
institutions to take these deals—even 80 cents on the dollar is a
lot better than foreclosure. This will be a complex procedure
that will take many months to resolve. Meantime, a morato-
rium on foreclosures is necessary. In any case, putting $700 bil-
lion into keeping Americans in their homes will do a lot more
good than handing $700 billion to the financial geniuses that
created the mess. Mortgage relief and restoring economic and
social stability to neighborhoods will bring about recovery
faster than Paulson’s plan to try to push credit on a string.
This brings us to the issue of affordability: can government
afford to “bail out” Wall Street, “bail out” homeowners, and
provide fiscal stimulus? Over the past year, the Fed has lent hun-
dreds of billions of dollars (some estimate that the Fed is on the
hook for $1.4 trillion) to U.S. banks and other institutions as
well as to Euroland central banks; it has also guaranteed assets
in private bank takeovers. Treasury has extended guarantees to
the government-sponsored enterprises and to deposits of up to
$250,000.Paulsonproposestoinject$250billionintobankequity
and to use much of the remainder of the $700 billion“bailout”to
buy bad assets. Congress is considering another fiscal stimulus.
And there is a well-recognized need to directly help homeowners.
The total of all of this is surely in the trillions of dollars.
7
Will this bankrupt Uncle Sam? First,it is necessary to clearly
separate lending from spending. Most of these funds represent
loans that will be mostly repaid. Even Treasury purchases of bad
assetsarenotreallyspending—itrepresentssubstitutiononbank
balance sheets of good assets (Treasury debt) for bad assets; the
Treasury issues a liability to obtain assets of questionable but
nonzero worth.And when the Treasury buys equity in financial
institutions, it shares in the profits (or losses) until such time
thattheinstitutionfinallyfails(wipingouttheTreasury’sshares)
or recovers (perhaps returning the Treasury’s investment with
capitalgains).Thecostof theseoperationswillnotbeknownfor
a long time, but it will not come close to the total $700 billion.
Bythesametoken,theseoperationsdoverylittletodirectly
increase aggregate demand; thus, by themselves they will not
help to bring us out of the deepening recession (although they
might prevent the recession from morphing into a depression).
Only a fiscal stimulus (tax cuts or spending increases) and direct
homeownerrelief willdomuchtostimulatedemand.Tobeclear,
the main responsibility for economic recovery is and must be in
the hands of the Treasury. The Fed is able to deal with the liq-
uiditycrisis,butitcan’tputmoreincomeintothehandsof con-
sumers. And since interest rates are already very low, there isn’t
much the Fed can do directly to lower borrowing costs. This
reality has finally begun to seep into the consciousness of belt-
way insiders. We had been assured for years that fiscal policy is
unneeded and even impotent, while monetary policy is power-
ful. It is now apparent that pundits had it exactly wrong: it has
always been about fiscal policy, while the Fed’s machinations
were just a diversion.
We are still left with the question, Can the Treasury afford
it? Quite simply, the answer is yes—and it is a bargain if one
considers the cost of not doing it. In a sovereign nation, the
spending of the national government is not constrained by its
balance sheets. Instead, spending is, and should be, constrained
by political considerations as well as real economic constraints:6 Policy Note, 2008 / 6
are there resources available to be mobilized? It is obvious that
there exist unused resources today, as unemployment rises and
factories are idled due to lack of demand.Markets are also voting
with their dollars for more Treasury debt—it is about the only
thing that global investors want to buy right now. Again, it is
obvious that if the Treasury offers more dollars and more dollar-
denominated debt, they will be welcomed. Any constraints now
facing the Treasury are political.Of course,recognizing this does
not mean that the Treasury should spend without restraint—
whatever rescue plan is adopted should be well planned and well
targeted, and of the appropriate size.
Many proposals have been suggested, including “lowering
the price of consuming” by suspending sales taxes, with the fed-
eralgovernmentcoveringthestateandlocalgovernmentrevenue
losses(Rosenwald2008).Wefavoratemporarysuspensionof the
collection of payroll taxes, with the Treasury directly making all
Social Security payments at least until the economy recovers.
This will put more income into the hands of households while
lowering the employment costs for firms, fueling spending and
employment. The United States faces a huge public infrastruc-
ture deficit of $1.6 trillion—best represented by collapsing
levies and bridges—that can be rectified through federal gov-
ernment grants to support local spending on needed projects
(Rohatyn and Rudman 2008). Whatever package of policies is
adopted, we will know when the Treasury has spent enough
becausetheeconomywillstartgrowingagaintowardfullemploy-
ment, and financial markets will recover.It is impossible to say in
advance whether that will take $700 billion or $2 trillion; but in
any case, it is affordable. Once the expansion gets under way, tax
revenue will begin to rise and government can cut back on its
own spending growth,automatically reducing the budget deficit.
The point is that setting arbitrary budget constraints is neither
necessary nor desired—especially in the worst financial and eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression.
So, that is the good news. As we hope we have made clear,
the nation can afford it. Likewise, Greenspan ended his testi-
mony on an upbeat note:“This crisis will pass,andAmerica will
re-emerge with a far sounder financial system.” There’s that
audacity of hope, but from a rather unlikely source. The
sounder financial system likely to emerge will be more closely
regulated, smaller and simpler, less leveraged, and based on
sound underwriting.A healthy dose of fear will have returned to
markets to counterbalance the natural greed of markets.Finally,
we will have a bigger role for fiscal policy, as we will have finally
banished to the dustbin the unwarranted hope that some maes-
tro in control of an inflation-fighting Fed is all that is required.
Notes
1. Greenspan(2008)testifiedthatthecrisis“hasturnedoutto
be much broader than anything I could have imagined. . . .
[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lend-
ing institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself
especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”
2. Bernanke argued that, in large part due to competent cen-
tral bank policy,the economy had become much more sta-
ble (Wray 2008a). The reference to Kool-Aid comes from
Warren Buffet:“It’s sort of a little poetic justice, in that the
people that brewed this toxic Kool-Aid found themselves
drinkingalotof itintheend”(quotedinDabrowski2008).
3. Internal messages leave no doubt: they knew they were
dealing in trash and openly admitted that they hoped they
would be long gone before the piper had to be paid.Instant
messages between two Standard & Poor’s officials called a
deal“ridiculous,”said that the assessment models used did
not even “capture half the risk,” and bragged, “We rate
every deal. It could be structured by cows, and we would
rate it”(U.S. Congress 2008).
4. William Greider (2008) calls it“Goldman Sachs socialism.”
See also, Creswell and White 2008.
5. Matt Landler (2008) reports,“In a step that could accelerate
a shakeout of the nation’s banks, the Treasury Department
hopes to spur a new round of mergers by steering some of
the money in its $250 billion rescue package to banks that
are willing to buy weaker rivals. . . . Two senior officials said
the selection criteria would include banks that need more
capital to finance acquisitions.”An anonymous official said,
“One purpose of this plan is to drive consolidation.”
6. The Treasury is currently applying some such procedure
when it decides to inject equity.However,the agency insists
that its criteria must be kept secret, on the implausible
argument that if a bank is turned down on criteria known
to the market, then there will be a run out of that bank. It
is hard to see why markets would be less likely to run when
the Treasury rejects a bank’s application for a capital injec-
tion on the basis of unknown criteria.
7. “Trillions”may sound like a lot. To put this in perspective,
the RFC injected $50 billion to rescue the banks in theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
1930s (it recovered its spending in subsequent years and
actually made a small profit on the resolution). If we were
to adjust that figure by inflation of the CPI, that would be
equal to $800 billion today. If we further adjust the figure
to take account of GDP growth (our economy is much big-
ger today,so the problem is bigger in absolute value terms),
that figure rises to $12 trillion!
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